Lattices in Cryptography by Guo, Andy
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Honors Scholar Theses Honors Scholar Program
Spring 5-3-2019
Lattices in Cryptography
Andy Guo
guoandy86@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses
Recommended Citation
Guo, Andy, "Lattices in Cryptography" (2019). Honors Scholar Theses. 612.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses/612
Lattices in Cryptography
Andy Guo
May 3, 2019
Abstract
The computers that exist throughout the world today, rely on two val-
ues, 0 and 1 to work and run. Quantum computers, on the other hand,
uses qubits which are quantum objects that can be in either a 0 or 1 state,
or even a superposition of 0 and 1 state. Quantum computers do not nec-
essarily make traditional computer algorithms run faster, but rather lets
us come up with new algorithms specifically for quantum computers that
will be faster than traditional computers. Quantum computer algorithms
are designed to make full use of superpositional states. These quantum
computers will be able to break commonly used public key cryptosystems
such as RSA, DSA, and other practical ones as well. Some physicists pre-
dict that quantum computers will become powerful enough in the next 10
years to break these existing public key cryptosystems. As a result, a new
field of research in post quantum cryptography is on the rise. One of the
most well known and researched post-quantum cryptography schemes are
ones that revolved around lattices.
1 Introduction
The computers that exist throughout the world today, rely on two values, 0 and 1
to work and run. Quantum computers, on the other hand, uses qubits which are
quantum objects that can be in either a 0 or 1 state, or even a superposition of 0
and 1 state. Quantum computers do not necessarily make traditional computer
algorithms run faster, but rather lets us come up with new algorithms specifically
for quantum computers that will be faster than traditional computers. Quantum
computer algorithms are designed to make full use of superpositional states. The
quantum computations in the algorithm are done in parallel on superpositions
of exponentially many inputs [23]. In other words, the quantum computer is
able to go down every path simultaneously, and quantum computer algorithms
exploit that to their advantage. The superpositional states of each qubit allows
it to represent multiple numbers or values simultaneously. The value of a qubit
is not determined till the end of the calculation when it has solved the problem.
These quantum computers will be able to break commonly used public key
cryptosystems such as RSA, DSA, and other practical ones as well [29]. Some
physicists predict that quantum computers will become powerful enough in the
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next 10 years to break these existing public key cryptosystems [5]. As a result,
a new field of research in post quantum cryptography is on the rise [5]. As
of right now, there are four research areas in the post-quantum cryptosystems
field that can stop quantum computers: code-based, hash-based, lattice-based,
and multivariate public key cryptosystems [7]. Out of the four, one of the most
well known and researched post-quantum cryptography schemes are ones that
revolved around lattices [21]. Lattice cryptography not only is a well known
post-quantum cryptography scheme, it also can be used for fully homomorphic
encryption.
Fully homomorphic encryption or FHE has been sought after for many years
by cryptographers [12], as it has been seen as an elusive goal that can solve the
world’s problems with security and trust. A homomorphic encryption means
that computations can be done directly to the encryption of a message instead
of decrypting the ciphertext and then encrypting it again. This would save
time and allows confidential data to be computed in unsafe environments and
still remain confidential. A system like this would help the flow of data and
information remain safe and secure. In unsafe and untrusted places, one would
not need to worry about the environment taking their data. The data will
not become vulnerable as it will never be decrypted to the original data, as
more computation can be done directly to the ciphertext. Since FHE is still an
encryption scheme, it would be ideal that it is based off an encryption scheme
that is known to be hard to break. As a result, a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme has been built from learning from errors assumption or LWE from the
works of Gentry [12]. The security of this scheme is not only based the assumed
hardness of LWE but also the sparse subset sum problem. The sparse subset
sum problem is defined as given a set of integers A, and two integers, t and M ,
find a sparse subset of the set that sums up to t mod M . The sparse subset
sum problem is hard and only gets harder when the given set is larger [17]. This
paper will discuss what makes lattices a good foundation for building quantum
computer resistant cryptography schemes.
A lattice is a regular arrangement of points in n-dimensional Euclidean space.
The set of points can be described by using a set of n linearly independent vec-
tors, v1, ..., vn ∈ Rn. A lattice is formally defined as the set of all integer com-
binations of those n linearly independent vectors. These linearly independent
vectors are known as the basis of lattice [26]. The lattice L can be represented
as
L = {
n∑
i=1
αivi |α ∈ Z}.
This shows that L is the integer combinations of the n linearly independent
vectors of the basis. The lattice is not the vector space spanned by the basis, as
the span of the basis is the set of all real linear combinations of the n vectors,
whereas the lattice only has the set of all combinations that has an integer
coefficient to it. Due to this, a lattice is a discrete set, meaning that the points
in the lattice cannot be too close to one another. There is a minimum distance
between points in each lattice, where the minimum distance is greater than
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0 [20]. This makes it so that lattice problems cannot be solved with simple
linear algebra. Another important thing to note about the basis of a lattice is
that it is not unique. There can be two bases that could end up generating
the same lattice. Two bases are equivalent if multiplying one of the bases by a
unimodular matrix will make the two equivalent
UB1 = B2,
where U is the unimodular matrix. An unimodular matrix is any square matrix
with integer entries that has a determinant of ±1.
Now that a lattice has been defined, lets go over some properties it and its
basis has. The rank of L is the number of vectors in B, and the dimension
of the lattice is just the dimension of each vector. If the rank is equal to the
dimension, then the lattice is called a full ranked lattice. The dimension of
a lattice is the number of elements in each column vector. All lattices has a
dual to them. Given a lattice, L, the dual of L, is L∗. L∗ is a lattice given
by the set of all vectors y ∈ Rn and the set of vectors x ∈ L such that for all
x ∈ L, 〈x, y〉 ∈ Z [26]. The dual of a lattice is also equivalent to the inverse of
the transpose of the lattice, L∗ = (LT )−1. From that, it can be shown that the
determinant of L∗ is the reciprocal of the determinant of L. The dual of a lattice
is important as it can be used to solve some of these hard lattice problems.
A basis that describes L can also generate a fundamental parallelepiped.
The fundamental parallelepiped of the basis is defined as
P (B) = {
n∑
i=1
xivi |xi ∈ [0, 1)}.
If the choice for the basis that describes L is clear, then P(B) can be rewritten
as P(L), which still means the fundamental parallelepiped as generated by the
basis that describes L. The volume of the fundamental parallelepiped of the
basis is the same as the determinant of L. The volume of the parallelepiped
is also the same for two different bases if they describe the same lattice. That
is not the only way to calculate det(L). It can also be calculated from finding
the absolute value of the determinant of a matrix which is made of the basis
vectors that describes L. Geometrically, the determinant of the lattice shows
the inverse density of lattice points in space. As mentioned before, a lattice
can be described by multiple bases, and each of those bases will have their
own respective fundamental parallelepipeds. The space can be “tiled” with the
fundamental parallelepiped, where each lattice point is given a copy of the fun-
damental parallelepiped [21]. The fundamental parallelepiped is also essential
in finding the modulo of a point x ∈ Rn. x mod P (L) is the unique point
y ∈ P (L) such that y − x ∈ L [26].
The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of a basis B = [v1, ..., vn] can be writ-
ten as B∗. B∗ = [v∗1 , ..., v
∗
n] is defined as,
v∗i = vi −
i−1∑
j=1
µijv
∗
j ,
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where µij is,
µij =
〈vi, v∗j 〉
〈v∗j , v∗j 〉
, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n.
The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization projects the vector vi of B onto a space
orthogonal to the space spanned by v1, ..., vi−1. However, the vectors produced
by the Gram-Schmidt procedure does not necessarily produce a lattice as the
vectors may not all be integer combinations of the basis, and as a result cannot
be a lattice. The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process, however, is useful
in help solving lattice problems such as SVP [11]. The procedure is useful in
reducing the basis to other forms such as a LLL reduced basis [10] or a BKZ
reduced basis [8]. In those examples, the input basis is taken and the Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization is done on the basis first and then other steps are
taken to find a reduced basis.
Each lattice has also its shortest distance between any two points in the
lattice. The shortest distance of a lattice is represented by the lambda symbol,
λ(L). The shortest distance is never 0 as that means the points are on top
of each other. That would also mean that the shortest (nonzero) vector has a
length of 0. However, since the origin vector is in every lattice, it is also the
lattice point with the smallest norm. Each lattice will always contain a pair
of points that will have the shortest distance of the entire lattice. Finding the
shortest distance, or the minimum distance is hard to do, and thus, has become
a lattice problem. The problem will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section. The more common properties of lattices has been discussed and in the
next section, some hard lattice problems will be discussed, specifically SVP,
CVP, and LWE, and later on how a public key cryptosystem can be built from
those problems, specifically the LWE problem.
2 Lattice Problems
The discovery of lattices also brought with it its fair share of problems that
are believed to be computationally intractable. Many existing lattice problems
have been proven to have average case hardness, and thus making them a good
foundation for building a cryptographic schemes [22]. Average case hardness
just means given any random instances of the problem, it is computationally
hard to solve. Proofs of security for cryptographic schemes is based on the
average case hardness of the problem it is built from. Many thought that NP-
hard problems would have been the perfect basis for building cryptographic
schemes from, but not all NP-hard problems can achieve average case hardness.
This means that for some instances of NP-hard problems they can be easy to
solve, therefore making it not suitable to build a cryptographic scheme from. On
the other hand, most lattice problems have been proven to achieve average case
hardness, and some have even been proven to have worst case hardness. Those
problems are more likely to withstand an attack from a quantum computer.
Worst case hardness means that any instance of the problem is hard to solve.
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So what makes these problems hard? The main reason these lattice problems
are considered hard is to due to the fact that there are not efficient solutions
to these problems. There does exist solutions, but none of them are efficient
enough to consider the problems easy to solve. As a result, some of the solutions
for these problems rely on finding approximate values instead of finding the
exact values, as the solutions for finding approximate values are slightly more
efficient [6]. There is a direct correlation between the hardness of a problem
and the security of a cryptographic scheme [16]. This is due to the fact that
the cryptographic scheme is built directly from the problem. If one can solve
the problem, then one can break the cryptographic scheme built from that
problem. If the solution is efficient, then the cryptanalysis of the scheme should
be efficient as well. However, in the case of these hard lattice problems, since
there does not exist an efficient algorithm, the cryptanalysis will be inefficient
as well. Due to these reasons, lattice problems has become popular in quantum
resistant cryptographic schemes. Some of the problems discussed will be the
Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in section 2.1, Closest Vector Problem (CVP)
in section 2.2, and finally, the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem in section
2.3.
2.1 Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)
SVP has three variants to it, decision, optimization, and search. Though there
are multiple variants to it, the underlying problem remains the same. They all
have to do with the shortest vector in the lattice and the shortest vector of L
can be represented as λ(L).
• Decision variant - given a basis B that describes L and a real number d,
where d > 0. Determine whether λ(L) is less than or greater than d.
• Optimization (or calculation) variant - given basis B that describes L, find
λ(L).
• Search variant - given basis B that describes L, find a vector v ∈ B such
that the norm of v is equal to λ(L).
SVP has been proven to be NP-hard under randomized reductions by Ajtai [3].
Problems that are NP-hard means that if they can be solved in polynomial time
than all NP problems can as well. NP problems are problems that are solvable
in polynomial time by a nondeterminstic Turing Machine [9]. There are many
known algorithms that can solve SVP, show can find the exact shortest vector,
while others can find the approximate shortest vector to a certain factor. It has
been shown that algorithms for finding the approximate shortest vector takes
less time than the ones that require the exact solution [24]. One of the best
known algorithms for approximation, can only solve it in polynomial time and
achieves an approximation factor of 2O(n) where n is the dimension.1 That
1This is interesting as it shows that approximating the shortest vector is not an easy task.
In fact, Ajtai showed that if finding an approximation to a factor of nc is hard in the worst
case, than finding the exact shortest vector will be hard in the average case [14].
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algorithm is known as the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lova´sz basis reduction algorithm or
the LLL basis reduction algorithm. More algorithms were discovered afterwards
with better approximation factors, but most of them still retain their polynomial
runtime [19]. Most of the known algorithms for solving the shortest vector
problem requires a reduction of some sort on the given basis. Reducing the
lattice makes the solution more efficient to find [30]. Though the reduction does
makes it the solution slightly easier to find, it still takes up to polynomial time
for the entire algorithm to run.
As mentioned before, one of the most well known algorithms to solve SVP
is the LLL basis reduction algorithm. The LLL basis reduction algorithm is an
algorithm that finds the approximate shortest vector and not the exact shortest
vector. The basis reduction algorithm reduces the given basis to a shorter or
smaller basis that describes the same lattice L. The shortest vector in integer
span of the basis is also the shortest vector in the lattice it describes [10]. Due to
that, many of the existing algorithms to solve SVP relies on reducing the given
basis to make it more efficient to approximate the shortest vector. (Note that
there is some basis that includes the shortest vector, so there is a connection
between the norm of basis vectors and difficulty of solving shortest vector.) One
of the most basis steps to most lattice reductions starts with a Gram Schmidt
Orthogonalization. By producing a more orthogonal basis and still describing
the same lattice, it becomes easier to find the shortest vector. A given basis for
the lattice could have long and narrow shape to it, and due to that, it will be
hard to calculate the shortest vector from that. But if the a second basis could be
produced from the first basis, and if the second vector describes the same lattice,
but the shape of it is smaller and more box like, then it is easier to determine
the shortest vector from that lattice. As a result, that basis is “better,” as it
is easier to use to solve these lattice problems. The LLL algorithm finds an
approximation within an exponential factor in polynomial time. The algorithm
was discovered in the early 1980s and still relevant in solving SVP and other
problems in number theory, cryptography, and integer programming [10]. The
LLL algorithm has two major steps to it.
LLL− algorithm
1. Perform Gram Schmidt orthogonalization on the given basis and get a
new basis B∗.
2. For each vi ∈ B∗, check for the following condition,
‖v∗i+1 + µi,i+1v∗i ‖2 <
3
4
‖v∗i ‖2.
If it holds, swap vi and vi+1 and repeats the first step, else it continues to
the next i.
The µ are known as the Gram Schmidt coefficients, and which are described
earlier in the introduction. The vectors v are from the original basis and the
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vectors v∗ are from the basis B∗. The Gram Schmidt process doesn’t neces-
sarily produce an basis that can describe a lattice, so to prevent that round
the projection µ to the nearest integer, that way the basis produced from the
Gram Schmidt procedure still describes a lattice. The basis is LLL-reduced if
the following two conditions holds,
1. ∀i 6= k, µi,k ≤ 12
2. ‖v∗i+1 + µi,i+1v∗i ‖2 ≥ 34‖v∗i ‖2
The first step takes polynomial time and the second time takes linear time, and
as a result the entire algorithm runs in polynomial time. It can approximate to at
most 2
(n−1)
2 times λ(L). From LLL algorithm many other reduction algorithms
has risen such as the HKZ reduction and so on [28]. SVP has been studied for
very long and so has CVP, a related lattice problem.
2.2 Closest Vector Problem (CVP)
CVP is very similar to SVP, and it is believed that SVP is no harder than
CVP [1]. CVP has been shown to be NP-hard as well by van Emde Boas in
1981 [14]. In the CVP, a basis B ∈ Rn is given, along with a target vector
t ∈ Rn. The goal is to find the closest point in B closest to the point p given.
While in SVP the all zero solution is not accepted, in CVP, the all zero solution
can an answer [22]. The all zero solution just means that the origin is the closest
vector. That cannot be the case for SVP. If the shortest vector could be 0, then
SVP would not be a hard problem at all, as the shortest vector will always be
the all zero vector. Due to that the zero vector is not an allowed answer for
SVP, but could be for CVP. Similarly to SVP, CVP also has three variants to
it, search, optimization, and decision.
• Search variant - given a basis B that describes L and a target vector t,
find the closest vector in L to t.
• Optimization variant - given a basis B that describes L and a target vector
t, compute d(t,L).
• Decision variant - given a basis B that describes L, a target vector t, and
a rational number r, determine whether d(t, B) ≤ r or d(t, B) > r
CVP is consider “harder” than SVP [1]. As a result, a reduction can be shown
of CVP to SVP, but no reduction can be shown in the other direction. Instead
of looking for the lattice vector that is closest to an arbitrary given vector, in
SVP we look for the shortest vector. An oracle that can solve CVP, can easily be
alter to output the norms of the vectors in the lattice rather than which vector
is closest to the target vector. Due to this reasoning, CVP can be reduced to
SVP and if CVP can be solved, then so can SVP.
One of the earliest found algorithms to solve CVP is Kannan’s algorithm as
well. The time complexity for this algorithm is nn/2+o(n). Since then, more time
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efficient has been discovered to solve CVP. For example, the Miccianio-Voulgaris
Algorithm has been found to be able to solve CVP in 2O(n) time. However,
one of the more well known algorithm to solve CVP is Babai’s Nearest Plane
Algorithm [2].
Babai′sNearestPlaneAlgorithm
1. Do a LLL reduction on the input lattice, L.
2. Look for an integer combination of the basis vectors that will make it close
to the target vector. This can be done with the simple algorithm:
b← t
f o r i = n to 1 :
b← b− cibi , where ci =
⌈ 〈b,b∗i 〉
〈b∗i ,b∗i 〉
⌋
output t− b
The algorithm works by looking for the a multiple for nth vector in the basis
B, to bring the nth coordinate in it to within ± 12‖b∗i‖, where b∗i is from the
LLL reduced basis. After doing that for nth vector, it moves on to the nth - 1
vector and keeps going till it reaches the first vector in the basis. In a sense,
it is looking for the closest plane to the target vector, hence the name of the
algorithm. The run time of the algorithm is in polynomial time of the input
size [2]. The returned vector from Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm is called
the Babai point. The Babai point may not be the closest vector to the target
vector, but the error of it can be bounded. How close the Babai point is to the
true solution is reliant on the given target vector and the basis given as well
for the lattice L. Just using Babai’s algorithm by itself without doing a LLL
reduction on the basis first does not guarantee that the solution vector will be
the closest vector to the target vector. However, after doing a LLL reduction
first on the given basis, then the solution vector can be found to an approximate
exponential factor of the closest distance to the target vector [2]. As one can
see, the LLL reduction algorithm is useful for many lattice problems not just
SVP. It helps find a better basis that will describe the same lattice to use in the
problem. As a result of that, the easier basis will make the algorithms to solve
the problems more efficient [10].
2.3 Learning with Errors (LWE)
The Learning with Errors problem was formalized by Oded Regev in 2005 and
he showed that LWE was as hard to solve as other worst case lattice problems
such as SVP and CVP [26]. The LWE problem is defined as such, given a basis
B generating L, and the value of Bx + e, the solution to the problem would be
successfully determining the value of x. The e is a small error on the Gaussian
distribution that is added to Bx to distort Bx so it would be hard to find the
value of x. By adding the error value, it makes it significantly harder to solve
the problem. There are two variants to this problem, the search and decision
versions.
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• Search variant - given a basis B that describes L and the value of Bx + e,
find x.
• Decision variant - given a basis B that describes L and C, determine if C
is C = Bx + e or random.
Without adding the error or noise to Bx, the problem would be easy to solve.
But adding just a little error to Bx makes it so that Bx is more hidden or
secretive. If one were to use the Gaussian elimination method to solve the
problem where there is no errors introduced, it would be easy to figure out
what the secret x is [27]. Using Gaussian elimination in finding the value of x
in Bx = C where C = Bx would be simple. Row operations can be performed
on B|C, where B|C just represents augmenting C as another column to B, to
put it into upper triangular form. Once it is in upper triangular form, the last
column of the new matrix is the value of x. A matrix in upper triangular form
is when all the values below the diagonal from the top left to bottom right is all
zeros. However, if the same method is used on the actual problem, all the errors
added would accumulate making it impossible to find out what the actual value
of x is. Due to that, a new method for solving had to be found. Similarly to
the SVP and CVP, some of the best known algorithms for solving this problem
all run in exponential time. The Blum, Kalai, and Wasserman algorithm, or
BKW algorithm for short, takes 2O(n) time [4]. Since the best known algorithm
still runs in exponential time and there is no known algorithm that can solve
it faster than that, LWE becomes a hard lattice problem. LWE is also seen
as a natural extension of the Learning Parity with Noise problem or LPN for
short [25]. LPN itself is widely believed to be hard as well, and if LWE is a
natural extension of it, it would be only right if LWE was hard as well. In LPN
one is given x, y, where y = 〈x, z〉+ 1 mod 2 with some probability (otherwise
given y = 〈x, z〉 mod 2). The vector z is used repeatedly with different vectors
x. As one can see, LWE and LPN is very similar and the main difference being
that LWE uses lattices and LPN can be done using integers. Either way, when
noise is introduced into the problem, it makes them both significantly harder.
LWE is also known to be hard based on assumptions regarding the worst case
hardness of problems such as GapSVP and SIVP. Due to all these factors, LWE
is believed to be hard [27] and hard to approximate as well.
The BKW algorithm takes both 2O(n) time and memory. It is the best
known algorithm to solve LWE as of right now [15]. The BKW algorithm was
originally developed to solve the Learning Parity with Noise problem or LPN
for short [18]. LWE is seen as a generalization of LPN to a larger modulo and
it has different error values. Since the BKW algorithm was developed for LPN,
it was able to be converted over to a similar algorithm that solved LWE [15].
There are three main steps to the BKW algorithm.
1. A sample reduction on the basis.
2. Determine some sub-solutions to recover some components of the secret
vector x.
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3. Substitute what has been figured out so far and in the process getting a
smaller LWE instance to solve.
The sample reduction is done through a Gaussian elimination. However, as
mentioned before, using the Gaussian elimination on this problem would amplify
the noise to the point where the secret vector cannot be recovered. Thus, instead
of doing all row reductions, only a few row reductions are done to it so that the
noise is low enough to be managable [4]. By only doing a few row reductions at a
time, only a few part of the secret vector can recovered at a time. After figuring
out parts of the secret vector x, it becomes easier to plug those values back in
and recover the rest of the parts of x [15]. However, as previously mentioned,
this still takes exponential time, and for a problem to be considered “easy”
it has to be able to be solved in a faster time than that. Another reason to
considered LWE hard is because it is believed to be hard under on assumptions
regarding the worst case hardness of other lattice problems such as GapSVP
and SIVP. [27]. Being able to easily solve LWE would mean that those lattice
problems can be solved easily as well.
3 Cryptography
Lattice based problems such as SVP, CVP, and LWE are used as the foundation
for building lattice based cryptography schemes. A simple public key cryptosys-
tem can be built from any of those problems. To show that, a PKC built from
LWE will be shown down below.
3.1 Public Key Cryptosystem using LWE
The main goal of LWE is to find the secret vector x, and in the PKC, this secret
vector x will be used as the private key. Before going into how the system works,
there are some basic parameters that needs to be defined first.
• n - the security parameter or dimension of the lattice
• m - number of equations or samples (choose m = 1.1 ∗ n log(q))
• q - modulus parameter (choose a prime between n2 and 2n2)
• α - noise or error parameter (has to be greater than 0 and let α =
1/(
√
n log2 n))
Choosing these parameters with the following guidelines will guarantee both
security and correctness. The private key for this system, as previously men-
tioned, is the secret vector x chosen uniformly from Znq . The public key is the
m samples of (Bi, bi) from i = 1 to m using the secret vector x, q, and α. bi in
the sample pair is the result of bi = Bix+ αi.
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To encrypt a message, choose a set S uniformly from the 2m subsets of m
samples for each bit of the message. If the bit is 0, then encrypt using(∑
i∈S
Bi,
∑
i∈S
bi
)
.
Otherwise if the bit is 1, then encrypt using(∑
i∈S
Bi, bq
2
c+
∑
i∈S
bi
)
.
As one can see, each bit of message is returned with a pair of values for decryp-
tion.
To decrypt a ciphertext, given any pair (B, b), if b - 〈B, x 〉 is closer to 0 than
bq/2c mod q, then the pair is decrypted as 0. 〈B, x〉 is the inner product of B
and x. If it is closer to bq/2c mod q, then it should be decrypted as 1. 〈B, x 〉 is
just the inner product of B and the private key vector x. This decryption works
as if there were no α values, then the decryption would strictly equal either 0 or
bq/2c. However, with the addition of the error, the decryption values become
close to and not exactly equal to either 0 or bq/2c. It rarely decrypts to wrong
bit as the sum of the errors over the set S is almost always under q/4. The
probability that it does decrypt to the wrong bit is negligible [27]. If the sum
was greater than q/4, then there might be some error in decrypting it as the
errors at that point are too large will change the message bits completely. The
probability that the sum of the errors is over q/4 is negligible and therefore it
can be assumed that it will always decrypt to the correct bits and then message.
The system is pretty straightforward, however, it is not ideal to use this in
a large scale setting as it is very inefficient [27]. The public key size is O(n2)
and encrypting the message increases the message size by a factor of O(n).
It works as a PKC, but using it regularly is not ideal, as it’ll end taking up
a lot of computing space as the message size increases. Since most of these
lattice problems become even harder in higher dimensions [13], including LWE,
increasing the dimensions of the lattice for LWE in this PKC will make the
public key size even bigger, because the public key size is equal to the square of
security parameter or the number of dimensions the lattice has. For LWE to be
truly effective, n has to be decent size number, and as a result cryptosystems
such as PKC will become inefficient to larger values of n. An ideal cryptographic
application built of LWE will be one that requires a smaller key size than the
key size of the PKC system. The security of the system has been shown to be
secured under the LWE hardness assumption [27]. Regev showed that given an
adversary that can efficiently guess the encrypted bit won’t be able to distinguish
between encryptions of 0 and 1 as they are equally distributed. The adversary
is given pairs (ai, bi), but it is not chosen from the LWE distribution, but rather
chosen uniformly from Znq ×Zq. From that, LWE samples can be distinguished
from the uniform samples for a non-negligible fractions of secret s. This shows
that this public key cryptosystem using LWE is secure and correct, but not the
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most efficient cryptosystem there could be. As a result, different methods are
applied and new cryptosystems using LWE has come to light.
4 Conclusion
Even though lattice cryptography is still rather young, it has become an ex-
tensively researched field. It has shown that it has the potential to become a
foundation for cryptographic schemes in the post-quantum era if it were ever
to come. From problems such as SVP to LWE, it has shown to have a variety
of problems that are considered hard to solve. Most of the work done in this
field can be split up into two major parts [20]. One part is involved in the math
part behind lattices, such as connecting the average case complexity of lattice
problems to worst case complexity. The other part is involved in building cryp-
tosystems from these existing problems. As of right now only the surface has
been scratched in this field, and it has to the potential to grow even bigger than
it is right now.
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